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What use is social problems theory?  
Forty years of uninterrupted reflection.  
An interview with Malcolm Spector
Edited by Enrico Caniglia and Luca Recchi
Malcolm Spector può essere considerato il co-fondatore, assieme a John Kitsuse, dell’approccio 
costruzionista ai problemi sociali. È stato co-autore, sempre assieme a Kitsuse, dei tre articoli, 
apparsi ai primi degli anni Settanta nella rivista «Social Problems» che inaugurarono il filone 
costruzionista dei problemi sociali, nonché coautore, ancora una volta con Kitsuse, del testo di 
riferimento principale dell’approccio: Constructing Social Problems, apparso nel 1977 e poi 
variamente ristampato nel corso degli anni. Ha insegnato prima alla Northwestern University, 
Chicago, dove ha incontrato per la prima volta John Kitsuse, e poi alla McGill University, in 
Canada. Dorothy Pawluch, coautrice assieme a Steven Woolgar di un contributo critico fonda-
mentale nello sviluppo della teoria costruzionista sui problemi sociali, è stata una sua allieva alla 
McGill. Spector si è occupato degli aspetti teorici dell’approccio costruzionista e ha compiuto 
diverse ricerche empiriche in questo ambito.
You are the author of fundamental papers in the sociology of social problems. Your most 
important and relevant published essays are signed by both you and J. Kitsuse as authors: 
how did you meet each other? Which was your way of working together? 
I was a student, both undergraduate and graduate, at Northwestern Uni-
versity in Evanston Illinois between 1961 and 1968. John Kitsuse was a pro-
fessor there. As an undergraduate student, I took his courses, especially a cri-
minology course in which he relied on the work of Edwin Lemert, one of his 
mentors. As a graduate student at Northwestern I also studied with John and 
worked as his research assistant on several small-scale studies, which focused 
on “the societal reaction.” John was on my thesis committee but my thesis was 
not a study in the sociology of deviance or social problems. It was an occu-
pational study of an office of government tax attorneys, in the tradition that 
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Everett C. Hughes developed at the University of Chicago. Howard Becker 
was my dissertation director.
I finished by doctorate in 1968 and moved to Montreal, where I taught 
in the Sociology Department at McGill University. In the early 1970s John 
invited me to teach a graduate seminar in sociological theory with him at 
Northwestern University. Our work together on the social construction of so-
cial problems began in that seminar. A number of writers, going back to the 
1920s, had written that, «Social problems are what people think they are». 
But this idea had never led to any consistent approach to studying the defini-
tional process. Our aim in that seminar was explain why people who began 
with that original idea eventually fell back into the more conventional functio-
nalist or positivist approaches.
Can you tell us something about the situation of the sociological studies and the aca-
demic context of that field of during the Seventies, when you and Kitsuse wrote your three 
essays in «Social Problems» (1973a, 1973b, 1975) introducing your theoretical proposal? 
Could you explain us a bit how you reached that theoretical formulation?
There was no substantive research area called “social problems” at that 
time. Social Problems was an introductory course for undergraduate students 
not studying sociology. At the same time, the study of deviance was emerging 
as an alternative to the study of crime and its causes. In Outsiders, Howard Be-
cker presented naturalistic, anthropological or ethnographic research reports 
on marijuana smokers and jazz musicians, outsiders or deviants. Becker also 
proposed that an essential part of studying those outsiders was investigating 
how these individuals came to be labeled as deviant. David Matza’s book, 
Becoming Deviant, provided a powerful conceptual analysis of the different ap-
proaches to becoming deviant. 
There were conceptual problems with labeling theory, particularly the “secret 
deviant” discussed by Becker. How could deviance be secret if labeling creates it? 
One had to be careful in talking about what” reactions to deviants” were reac-
tions to. Could one talk about, and study, the societal reaction to deviance? Or 
did one have to confine the perspective to the societal reaction that constitutes or 
creates deviance? John Kitsuse always took the latter view and thus he proposed 
a “labeling theory of social problems,” in which the subject matter would be the 
societal (or social) activities that create definitions of social problems, and the 
condition defined as a problem would always be a “putative condition.”1
1 In a brilliant essay, Prudence Rains, another student of  both John Kitsuse and Howard Be-
cker, described the key role of  this concept. «Like the term ‘alleged,’ ‘putative’ is intentionally, 
even ostentatiously, careful talk, allowing one to speak of  something without commitment to its 
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Social constructionism was introduced by Berger and Luckmann in the mid Sixties. 
What was your opinion of this theory and how did Kitsuse’s and your idea of social con-
structionism differ from Berger and Luckmann?
Berger and Luckmann’s book was only one of many approaches to social 
constructionism. Symbolic interactionism and the so-called Chicago School 
of Sociology were others. All of these interpretive approaches focus on how 
people construct and interpret their social relations, institutions and reality. 
The same is true of the labeling approach to deviance. None of these relied 
on Berger and Luckmann. Indeed, I do not think that we ever cited Berger 
and Luckmann. I may have read their book as a student, but I never used it 
in teaching. I do not consider it an important influence on my work. I do not 
remember that John ever cited it or relied on it.
Which was your contribution to the three well-known essays published in «Social Pro-
blems» (1973a; 1973b e 1975), that had been signed by you and J. Kitsuse together? In 
which measure did you participate in the theoretical and written organization of the essays?
Most readers will recognize that the intellectual style of our work was the 
culmination of the brilliant career of John I. Kitsuse. John made no attempt to 
be reasonable. He rejected a “balanced approach.” He did not compromise. 
He did not synthesize competing paradigms. He did not try to convert the 
opposition. He did not try to make everyone happy. At most, he diffidently 
remarked that his work was a methodological critique of more positivist work. 
The lessons from his work for students of theory extend far beyond the confi-
nes of the study of social problems.
John had already published his critique of official statistics. With Aaron 
Cicourel, he had published a study of how high school guidance counselors 
advised students on their college plans. John was a student of and follower of 
Edwin Lemert, whose distinction between primary and secondary deviation 
introduced labeling theory ideas in his textbook, Social Pathology. 
John wanted to apply to social problems the “societal reaction” approach. 
His style was to isolate one idea and follow it to its conclusion. But all previous 
writers who had flirted with the societal reaction approach to social problems 
failed to follow this idea. Our first article described how they deviated from 
this idea. The same is true of the article on social problems and deviance. 
Although John and I worked together, exchanging many drafts of these two 
articles and chapters, the style, the goals and the methods are those that John 
pursued throughout his intellectual career.
actuality…. The phrase ‘reactions that impute mental illness’ does not, after all, require mental 
illness in the same way that the phrase ‘reactions to mental illness’ does». (1975:3).
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We found interesting the idea of the ‘natural history’ of social problem. What is the path 
that led you to use this conceptual tool? What are the advantages and/or disadvantages or 
criticalities of this approach?
Once you have decided to focus exclusively on the definitional process, the 
next question is how do you study it? One major goal of Constructing Social Pro-
blems was to provide tools to launch and support an empirical substantive area 
into the definitional process. The concept of ”natural history” is one of those 
tools. As “history,” it urges the researcher to develop case studies in the con-
struction of definitions of social problems. The “natural” part of natural hi-
story urges the researcher to look for commonalities across case studies of such 
definitions. For example, many troublesome behaviors have been sequentially 
defined as sins, then as crimes, and then as diseases. 
A second component of the natural history concept is that as a social pro-
blems definition develops through claims, counter-claims and responses, the 
reference of the claims may, itself, evolve. The first wave of claims may com-
plain that nothing is being done about X. Then when there is some response, 
the claim may be that what is being done about X is wrong. We did not intend 
to suggest that all social problems definitions would go through these two sta-
ges, only that over time the focus of the claim might undergo change. 
Most of the tools proposed to advance research on the definitional process 
were borrowed from the Chicago School of Sociology and its tradition of 
studying work, occupations, the professions and communities. Our aim was to 
identify a set of easily observable activities and provide a theoretical rationale 
and empirical tools to study them.
The publication of your three essays inaugurated a new branch of researches. Several 
essays in that field of studies appeared in years mainly in «Social Problems»: we are thinking 
about the writings of Pfhol, Loseke, Best, Gusfield, etc. What are your general opinions 
about these essays? Do you think that they were aligned with your original idea of a sociology 
of social problems, or did they move away from it? 
In general, I cannot complain that these essays misrepresent our approach. 
All of the authors are sympathetic to the definitional approach. Their rese-
arch reports focus on some part of the definitional process. Most of the essays 
are reflections based on the research experience. I particularly admire the 
work of Valerie Jenness and the work of Donileen Loseke. Both did research 
based on observational studies of the use and construction of social problems 
definitions. Their work is unusual and special because many other case stu-
dies of social problems rely primarily on documentary evidence.
Some of the essays that draw on ethnomethodology are somewhat removed 
from the main thrust of Constructing Social Problems. However, I recognize 
that John Kitsuse was much more symphathetic to the ethnomethodological 
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project than I was. This is evident in his subsequent work with Peter Ibarra, 
which I discuss below. The best of the early essays is by Woolgar and Pawluch, 
which I also discuss below.
As a general matter, there is a danger that our field can become bogged 
down with theoretical hair-splitting and overly subtle distinctions. This can 
create a fear that unless the writer adheres perfectly to some orthodoxy, the 
work will be terribly flawed. That should not be the case. The empirical field 
of study is easily identified and most researchers have had no trouble focusing 
exclusively on the definitional process.
Steve Woolgar and Dorothy Pawluch, in 1985, criticized your essays with the ‘onto-
logical gerrimandering’ argument. Pawluch has been your student and scholar. Can you 
tell us something about the background of the appearance of the ontological gerrimandering 
critique? Did you have the chance to discuss about it with D. Pawluch previously? Did you 
already personally know Woolgar at the time?
Dorothy Pawluch was a doctoral student at McGill University during the 
time I was editor of Social Problems. She studied with me, worked on the 
journal, and wrote her dissertation on the New Pediatrics, a studied that com-
bined an interest in the professions, deviance and social problems. Steve Wo-
olgar was a visiting professor in the Department of Sociology at McGill for se-
veral years in the early 1980s. I knew him quite well. After I finished my term 
as editor of Social Problems I went on sabbatical and while I was away Steve 
taught the course in social problems that I had been teaching for a number 
of years. My understanding is that while he was teaching that course, he and 
Dorothy began to do the research that led to their article. It was submitted 
to Social Problems, reviewed, and published by the subsequent editor. I see 
that the authors thank me for my “helpful comments” in preparing the manu-
script, but I do not specifically remember whether I read and commented on 
the manuscript before or after it was accepted for publication.
Criticism of Constructing Social Problems got off to very good start with the 
article by Woolgar and Pawluch. They get high marks for actually reading, 
very closely, all of the research done up to that time. Their critique has a bril-
liant knife-edge. You always feel that they are sympathetic to the approach. 
However, right up to the end, I had the sinking feeling that we might have 
to pack our bags and look for another line of work. But then magically, on 
the last page, they let us off the hook. The gerrymandering is, in their words, 
“inevitable and unavoidable.” Ah, well, that’s a relief. We could unpack our 
bags and go back to business. 
Their point was essentially philosophical, but we are not philosophers. 
There are philosophers who share our curiosity about the world. They would 
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do empirical research if only they could solve all the logical, conceptual, epi-
stemological and methodological problems, and deduce a set of testable hypo-
theses. But they cannot. Instead, they are condemned to a lifetime of thinking.
As sociologists, on the other hand, we are committed to doing research, 
even if we cannot, and have not, solved all these problems. We know that re-
search is messy, especially our kind of research. We know our tools are flawed. 
We know our own story is intertwined with the story of our subjects, both the 
story of our (low caste) discipline, and our story as individual researchers. And 
yet we do not let that stop us.
Another interpretation of the findings of Woolgar and Pawluch is that the 
research reports they studied were published when the definitional appro-
ach was in its infancy and was, to say the least, neither well established, nor 
well respected. The authors were members of a more or less irrelevant and 
irreverent fringe group of young scholars. In the same year that Constructing 
Social Problems was published, my own department turned me down for tenure. 
They said my written work was not promising.
So, while presenting impeccable constructionist case studies, many young 
scholars inserted the kind of “reasonable” statements that Woolgar and 
Pawluch highlight, to please Chairs, Deans, and Editors. Fortunately these 
pressures did not lead them to focus on the “causes of the conditions.” 
We must not let the philosophers put us in chains. Several commentators – 
Mel Pollner and Joel Best come to mind – have written that the more we focus 
on these conceptual conundrums the less able we are to do research, and the 
research that we are able to do is limited to the point of triviality.
We are very interesting in your personal idea about the answer formulated by Ibarra and 
Kitsuse to the Woolgar and Pawluch critique. Do you find it persuasive? Would you modify 
or adjust it in some ways? Do you think that the loss of importance of the social and histori-
cal context in favor of arguments and argumentation’s construction is it a fundamental issue 
within Ibarra-Kitsuse’s answer?
I will admit that for over twenty years I have returned to, and puzzled over, 
John’s work with Peter Ibarra. They seem to have struggled mightily with the 
bedeviling conceptual problem of the status of the sociologist and the logical 
status of his or her “members’ perspective” in the definitional process. Some 
people have written that they solved this dilemma. I do not find their propo-
sed replacement of the concept of claims-making with “condition category” 
useful. When I look at their quasi-literary criticism and content analysis of 
words and phrases in our culture and language, I do not see a program for a 
vigorous research agenda on the social problems process. 
The perspective of the sociologist is present is different ways. It will always 
be present when sociologists choose something to study. They will always 
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choose to study something they think is important. Who would choose to 
spend months or years studying something that is not important? There are 
institutional pressures of many kinds on the researcher. These may relate to 
the career stage of the researcher, pressures from the university or other in-
stitutions where the researcher works, or the status of sociology compared to 
other disciplines, to name a few. These are not conceptual problems, but are 
themselves research topics, if anyone finds them interesting enough to study. 
I think we must live with, and cope with, our place in the world as we study 
it and not let it prevent us from doing research or turn us into philosophers.
You were a pioneer of a field of studies that had attracted a lot of scholars and authors. 
Which are your personal ideas about the developments of the approach that you co-started? 
Which are – in your opinion – the most original developments and argumentations, if there 
are been? 
It has been forty years since the publication of Constructing Social Problems. 
In many ways the goals of our approach have been realized. Everyone who 
has adopted our approach has succeeded in focusing exclusively on the de-
finitional process. No one has fallen back into a search for the causes of the 
putative conditions. There may still be positivists and functionalists teaching 
social problems, but now the study of the social problems process has emerged 
as a separate field of research, and many who have followed this approach 
have had excellent careers and produced a large body of interesting work.
Looking back, some of our key concepts seem slightly archaic or out of 
date. Our central concept, claims-making activities, and the image that the 
claimant is a member of, or spokesperson for, a social movement organization, 
now seems slightly archaic or out of date. Of course these claims-makers and 
social movements still exist, but times have changed. The constituencies and 
resources that can be assembled instantly through social media have radically 
altered the landscape of social disapproval. There was no discussion of “going 
viral” in Constructing Social Problems, but we have to deal with it now.
In addition to telling the stories of individual social problems, I have 
always been interested in the institutional context, the infrastructure of the 
definitional process. As the examples in chapter 1 of Constructing Social Pro-
blems show, I was particularly interested in groups and individuals who create 
categories and new words, and who used these categories to process or sort 
new items or issues: cataloguers at the Library of Congress, committees that 
revise Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Diseases2, or other systems of catego-
2 I wrote an article describing how the American Psychiatric Association decided that homo-
sexuality was not a mental illness.
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA236
ries such as the Yellow Pages, or The Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature. This 
list alone shows how much has changed in forty years. Google and its massive 
content-based search capabilities have put some of theses category workers out 
of business or driven them to the margins. Going forward we should discover 
and describe the evolving infrastructure to understand contemporary social 
problems stories. 
Regarding the theoretical proposals after your book and after the ontological gerrimande-
ring critiques, what is your opinion about the main ones, for example Joel Best’s and Darin 
Weinberg’s ones?
I don’t want to focus on the various conceptual distinctions between strict 
constructionist and contextual constructionists, or hard versus soft construc-
tionism. Once you have decided to study the definitional process and put aside 
other types of research, the only task is to find substantive tools to help disco-
ver and tell the stories of how social problems are constructed. As a person 
who has written essays, I should not complain when other people write essays. 
But original research is the engine that drives our field. If the field becomes 
consumed with and dominated by essays rather than research reports, it will 
die.
May I offer some advice to the young scholar or potential social problems 
researcher?
1. Ignore the critical literature. Do not waste too much time reading it. Do 
not cite it. Do not contribute to it. Do not feel that you have to master it 
before beginning your empirical research. Do not take sides in the contro-
versies. Do not try to resolve the disagreements. Do not adopt the horrible 
terminologies and categories found in the literature on “constructionist 
controversies.”
2. Commit to studying some part of the definitional process. Focus only on 
the definitional process. Put aside other research interests. Do not try to do 
two (or more) things at once. If you have other interests, for example in the 
actual nature or causes of some condition that is controversial, do not mix 
that work with your study of the social problems process.
3. Find some group or institution that participates in the definitional process. 
Attach yourself to them. Tell their story. Forty years ago John Kitsuse and 
I promised that these stories would be interesting, (and publishable!) and 
they have been.
4. Be aware that telling the definitional story shifts the moral discourse. As 
Prudence Rains wrote, «A decision about what ‘reactions to deviance’ are 
reactions to tends also to become a statement about the degree to which 
such reactions are warranted, and this more implicit matter of moral tone 
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has also plagued labeling theorists and their critics» (1975:2). If your rese-
arch is well done, you, too, will be “plagued” by these moral dilemmas. 
Try to resist and avoid making the kinds of “reasonable” and accommoda-
ting statements that attracted the attention of Woolgar and Pawluch.
You reached the idea that the constructionist component plays a central and fundamental 
role in social problems: is it still such nowadays, or do you think that the study of construc-
tionist component in social problems have to be put in contact with the study of historical 
conditions in the definitional processed occurrences?
The idea is fairly well established that the unique subject matter of the 
sociology of social problems is the process of social and societal disapproval. 
This is really all that is needed to define the field: the social construction of 
social problems. It is a small step further to acknowledge that everything - not 
just social disapproval – is socially constructed and that researchers should 
always keep in mind that anything that they might choose to study is also a so-
cial construction. Thus, the theoretical rigor that John Kitsuse brought to the 
early theoretical approaches to social problems could provide useful lessons 
to those whose interests do not touch on social problems at all. Thank you for 
you interest in the development of Constructing Social Problems.
